CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM

LSS'Y P/H: 51140E301 SHEET:

REF.	REV.	DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE HODE AND CAUSE	FATEURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR 7 FUNC. 1/1 RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE CRITICALITY
1130		DIRECT DRIVE COMMANDS QTY-1 REF. SIGNAL CIRCUIT E087315	MODE: LOSS OF 12.40 \$1GMAL. CAUSE(S): (1) ZENER \$/C (UPPER ZENER)	12.4V SIGNAL (* DRIVE) MILL 0E SHORTED TO 6.2V. JOINTS WILL DRIVE 'NEG' FOR 'POS' OR 'MEG' COMMAND. MORST CASE LINEXPECTED MOTION, WRONG JOINT DIRECTION REG. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING N/A	THE REQUIRED SIGNALS ARE DERIVED FROM TWO 6.2 VOLT, ZEMER DIGOES. THE DIODES ARE SERIES CONNECTED WITH A 750 OHN RESISTOR ACROSS THE ZBVDC POWER SUPPLY. THE DIODES ARE PROTECTED AGAINST VOLTAGE TRANSISTEMES BY A 0.1 UF CERAMIC CAPACITOR, LORST CASE POWER STRESS LEVEL IN EACH DIODE IS APPROX. 32 PER CENT OF RATED. POWER DISSIPATION IN THE RESISTOR IS APPROX. 46 PER CENT OF RATED. EEE PARTS HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-MINS-PA.003. THIS DOCUMENT DEFINES THE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLING EEE PARTS. THE REQUIREMENTS AND ADEQUATE DERATING OF PART STRESS LEVELS. PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES ARE SPECIFIED TO ENSURE AT LEAST EQUIVALENT QUALITY FOR MONISTANDARD AND IRREGULAR PARTS. ALEAST EQUIVALENT QUALITY FOR MONISTANDARD AND IRREGULAR PARTS. RELIABILITY ALLEYS. AREOSPACE DESIGN SYANDARDS FOR DETAILING ELECTRONIC PARTS PACKAGING, MOMITING AND STRUCTURAL/MECHANICAL/INTEGRITY OF ASSENBLIES ARE APPLIED. SUCH DESIGN AND REVIEWED AND FOUNDS STAISFACTORY TROUGH THE DESIGN AUDIT PROCESS, INCLUDING THE USE OF RELIABILITY MAINTAINMENTALY AND EXPLEY LIVER AND FOUNDS STAISFACTORY TROUGH THE DESIGN AUDIT PROCESS, INCLUDING THE USE OF RELIABILITY MAINTAINMENTALY AND EXPLOYED AND FOUNDS STAISFACTORY TROUGH THE DESIGN AND EXPRESS ANALYSIS AND DESIGN AND EXCLUDING THE USE OF RELIABILITY MAINTAINMENT AND SEPARATION AND TO THE MASA MATERIALS SURVE ASSENBLITY AND SHE'RY CHECKLISTS. MATERIAL SURVEY TROUGH AND USAGE CONFORMS TO SPAR-SG.360 WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO THE MASA MATERIALS SURVEY BOOK OF THE WAS AND TOWN OF THE WAS
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PREPARED BY: MEMG SUPERCEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED 1

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REF. REV.	WARE, UTY & FAILURE F DRAWING REF. AND DESIGNATION CAUSE	ON	R / FUNC. 1/1 RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
1130 0	DIRECT DRIVE COMMINDS OTY-1 REF, SIGNAL CIRCUIT ED87315 CAUSE(S): (1) ZENER B/C (UPPER ZENER)	12.4V SIGNAL (* ORIVE) WILL BE SHORTED TO 6.2V. JOINTS WILL DREVE 'NEG' FOR 'POS' OR 'NEG' COMMAND. WORST CASE UNEMPECTED MOTION, WRONG JOINT DIRECTION, UMANUMICIATED. CREW ACTION REO. REDUNDANT PATHS RENAIMING	ACCEPTANCE TESTS THE NAMBUARE TEM IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS PART OF THE DEC PAMEL. O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1 O THERMAL: +100 DEGREES F TO +10 DEGREES F 2 CYCLES (9.5 MRS PER CYCLE) THE DAC PAMEL ASSEMBLY IS FURTHER TESTED AS PART OF THE RMS SYSTEM (1PS18 AMS STRONGBACK TEST AND TPS52 PLAT FLOOR TEST) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE. QUALIFICATION TESTS THE DAC PAMEL HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION TEST ENVIRONMENT: O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1 O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1 O SNOCK: 200/11MS - 3 ANES (6 DIRECTION) O THERMAL: 130 DEGREES F TO 22 DEGREES F (12 MRS PER CYCLE) (6 CYCLES) O MUMIDITY: 95% (120 DEGREES F TO 82 DEGREES F CYCLE IN 16 HRS) 10 CYCLES TOTAL O EMC: MIL-STO-61 AS MODIFIED BY SL-F-0002 (TEST CEO1, CE CEO3, CS01(DC/AC), CS02, CS06, RE02 (B/N), RS02, RS03, RS04) REDZ (B/M) RS02, 03, 04) FLIGHT CHECKOUT FLIGHT CHECKOUT

PROJECT: SRMS ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL

SYSTEM: DEC SUBSYSTEM ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET:

REF. REV.	DRAWING RÉF. DESIGNATION	FATLURE HODE AND: CAUSE	FATLURE EFFECT ON END TIEM	HOWR / FUNC. 1/1 RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE CRITICALITY
1130 0	DIRECT DRIVE COMMANDS QTY-1 REF. SIGNAL CIRCUIT ED87315	MODE: 10S\$ OF 12.4V \$IGMAL. CAUSE(\$): (1) ZENER \$/C (UPPER ZENER)	12.4V SIGNAL (* DRIVE) WILL BE SHORTED TO 6.2V. JOINTS WILL DRIVE 'NEG' FOR 'POS' OR 'NEG' COMMAND. WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION, WRONG JOINT DIRECTION, UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REG. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING M/A	OA/INSPECTIONS EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100X SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM, AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100X RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS. BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 OM A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5X OF PARTS, MAXIMUM S PIECES MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT MUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED. WIRE IS PROCURED TO SPECIFICATION MIL-M-22759 OR MIL-W-81381 AND INSPECTED AND TESTED TO MASA JSCHABORD SHAMDARD MUMBER 95A. RECEIVING INSPECTION WERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS 10ENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE MASO OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS. PARTS ARE IMSPECTED IHROUGHOUT NAMUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE HASPECTIONS INCLUDE, PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND IMSPECTORS AND ENTIFIED TO MASA MHB 5300.4(5A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC 08800A. COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND IMSPECTION, AS MODIFIED BY JSC 08800A. COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES. POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CONRECT BOARD HASTALLATION, ALLGRIMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT MATTING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC., PRE-TEST INSPECTION OF OSC PANEL ASSY INCLUDES AN ALDIT OF LOWER HIER INSPECTION CONFLICTION, CHECK FOR CONFECTOR CONTACT MATTING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC., SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. A TEST READINES. REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF SESSON EXCHANCES IN COMPUTATION OF THE PROFILEMENT OF ANY VALI

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SAMS

ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL

ASS'Y P/N: STICESPT

SHEET: 4

FHEA REF.	AEV.	DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FATEURE ROOF AND CAUSE	FATLURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOUR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY ASS'V P/N: STICUESVI SHEET: 6 RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
1130		01Y-1 12.4V REF. SIGNAL SIGNAL CIRCUIT ED07315 CAUSE((1) ZE \$/C (U	MODE: LOSS OF 12.4V SIGNAL., CAUSE(S): (1) ZENER' S/C (UPPER ZENER)	12.4V SIGHAL (* DRIVE) WILL BE SHORTED 10 6.2V. JOINTS WILL DRIVE 'NEG' FOR 'POS' OR 'NEG' COMMAND. WORST CASE WMEXPECTED MOTION. WROMG JOINT DIRECTION. UMANHUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING M/A	IHERMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT). INTEGRATION OF DAC PAMEL, RHC. THC AND MCIU, INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH STAGE OF INTEGRATION, WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, INTER CONNECT CABLE VERIFICATION, CONNECTOR INSPECTION FOR BENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS ETC. SUB-SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TESTING (ATP), INCLUDES AN AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT). SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, INL INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION UNICH INCLUDES GROUNDING, CHECKS, THRU WIRTING CHECKS, WIRTING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC. SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)

PREPARED BY: MING SUPERCEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86 APPROVED BY: DATE:

PROJECT: SAMS ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL CRITICAL ITEMS LIST SYSTEM: DEC SUBSYSTEM ASS'Y P/N: 51740E391 SHEET: _ DRAWING BEF. FATLUME MODE FAILURE EFFECT REF. REV. AND 1/1 RAFFOMALE FOR ACCEPTANCE DESIGNATION CAUSE END ITEM CRITICALITY MODE: LOSS OF 12.4V SIGNAL. 1130 0 DIRECT DRIVE 12.4V SIGNAL FAILURE HISTORY CONNANDS (+ DRIVE) WILL BE SHORTED TO OTY-1 REF. SIGNAL CIRCUIT 6.2V. JOINTS NO EEE PARTS FAILURES HAVE OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO ASSEMBLY OF WILL DRIVE 'NEG' FOR 'POS' OR 'NEG' COMMAND. CAUSE(\$): E087315 (1) ZEMER \$/C (UPPER ZEMER) WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION, WRONG JOINT DIRECTION. UNAHMUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING M/A

DATE: PREPARED BY: HING SUPERCEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

PROJECT: SRMS ASS'Y NOMENCEATURE: DAC PAREL SYSTEM: DAC SUBSYSTEM ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

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REF. ACV.	NAME OTY A OMANING MÉF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE NODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNG. 1/1 RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE CRITICALITY
1830	DIRECT DRIVE COMMANDS QTY-I REF. SIGNAL CINCUIT EDB7315	HODE: LOSS OF 12.4V SIGNAL. CAUSE(S): (1) ZEHER S/C (IPPER ZENER)	12.4V SIGNAL (* DRIVE) MILL BE SHORTED TO 6.2V JOINTS HILL DRIVE 'MEG" FOR 'POS" OR 'NEG" COMMAND. MORST CASE UNEXPECTED HOTION. MRONG JOINT DIRECTION. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. REDUMDANT PATHS REMAINING M/A	OPERATIONAL EFFECTS JOINT DOES HOT RESPOND PROPERLY TO COMMANDS IN DIRECT MODE. CREW ACTION REMOVE COMMAND. CREW TRAINING THE CREW SHOULD BE TRAINED TO ALWAYS OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS REPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISM'F, THE COMMAND SHOULD BE REMOVED. MISSION COMSTRAINT OPERATE AT LESS THAM VERNIER RAYES WITHIN 10 FT OF STRUCTURE BY CYCLING SMITCH. OPERATOR MUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS. SCREEN FAILURES H/A OMRSD OFFLINE EXERCISE DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH VERIFY VOLTAGE ON DIRECT ORIVE MAROWIRE LINES AT DAC PAMEL OUTPUT OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION EXERCISE DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH VERIFY VOCTAGE ON DIRECT DRIVE HAROWIRE LINES AT LONGERON INTERFACE OMRSD ONLINE TURMAROUND EXERCISE DIRECT DRIVE COMMANDS VERIFY CORRECT JOINT HOTOR RESPONSES

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